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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and
nancial imperfections have on rm growth. We analyse institutions af-
fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product
Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the benecial ef-
fects of nancial development, a rm will get less nancing, and thus invest
less, in a weak nancial market (nance e¤ect), the strictness of product
and labor market regulations also a¤ect rm growth (labor e¤ect). In
particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the
inuence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of coun-
tries. We also show that the labor e¤ect overcomes the positive nance
e¤ect.
JEL classi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Starting with Schumpeter´s seminal paper (1911), the relationship between
the nancial system and economic growth has been extensively analyzed. Finan-
cial development is said to foster economic growth both at the macroeconomic
and the microeconomic level (Levine 1997, Demirguç-kunt and Maksimovic
1999). Furthermore, Coase (1992) and North (1994) in their Nobel speeches
emphasize the importance for economic growth of getting the institutional and
legal environment right. La Porta et al. (1998) contribute to this debate, an-
alyzing the relevance of the institutional framework in rm capital structure
and nancial development. In particular they nd that common law countries
enjoy more developed nancial markets than continental Europe.The bulk of
these studies analyze the nancial development e¤ects in an isolated way, not
paying attention to product market competition and labor market exibility are
also considered to a¤ect economic growth. However, there are large di¤erences
in product and labor markets across countries, in particular, OECD countries
remain characterized by widely di¤erent approaches to their markets, Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2003).
Interactions between labor and product market regulations have received
considerable attention in recent years. When we talk about labor regulation
we are thinking about Employment Protection Legislation (EP), which encom-
passes any set of regulations, either legislated or written in labor contracts. EP
is generally thought to a¤ect rm cost structure; it leads to higher direct costs
and thus lower employment (Blanchard and Tirole 2003 and Blanchard and
Giavazzi 2003). Product Market Regulation (PM) are the burdens and admin-
istrative procedures to entry into an industry and are considered opportunity
costs for the rm. Both EP and PM are costs that rms have to face and
then discourage entrepreneurship. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), according
to the degree of strictness of these regulations identify two main groups. The
common-law countries, on the one hand, which are characterized by a relatively
liberal approach in both the labor and product markets and most continental
European countries and Japan on the other, which share relatively restrictive
product market policies and EP.
Despite the relation between rm nance, labor and market regulations and
economic growth, these various branches of the literature have not been com-
bined in investigating empirically the e¤ects of nancial and labor frictions on
growth. The goal of this paper is shed some light on these relationships. We
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expand the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) (hereafter
RZ) to assess the relationship between nancial development, labor and prod-
uct regulation and rm growth. We use UNIDO data from 29 industrial sectors
across 15 developed countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the related literature.
Section 2 presents the data used in our empirical application. Sections 3 and
4 present the model specication and main results respectively and Section 5
concludes.
1 Related literature and Hypothesis
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. The rst one is the -
nance literature. There are several papers that have established an empirical link
between nancial development and rm behavior. In particular, well-developed
nancial markets have seen shown to make it easier for rms to attract exter-
nal nancing for their investment needs. Therefore, rm debt structure di¤ers
across institutional frameworks and nancial market imperfections a¤ect rm
nancing and investment decisions (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Demirguç-Kunt
and Maksimovic 1999, Booth et al. 2000). Furthermore, King and Levine (1993)
and Levine (1997) show that nance matters for economic growth.
The second strand we draw on is the labor market literature. This literature
studies the impact of labor market regulation on employment. Specically, en-
try regulation and EP are shown to a¤ect job creation and entrepreneurship. If
EP legislations were optimally set they could be considered as ways to provide
insurance against job loss and internalize the social costs of dismissals (Lindbeck
and Snower 1988, Pissarides 2001, Blanchard and Tirole 2003), with no e¤ects
on economic activity. In practice, however, they may a¤ect the equilibrium
level of employment. EP may enhance productivity performance, as workers
will be more willing to cooperate with employers (Akerlof 1984). Moreover, to
the extent that EP leads to long-lasting work relationships, it may encourage
employers to provide training to workers. A better skilled workforce may also
increase internal exibility and thus lead to a better functioning of production
activity (Piore 1986). However, if EP is very strict, as in many European coun-
tries, rms may become more cautious about adjusting their workforce with the
ultimate e¤ect of reducing labor turnover (Bertola 1992). Thus, EP provisions
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that increase hiring and ring costs are likely to be particularly detrimental for
employment and economic activity (OECD 2004).
PM are generally motivated on public interest grounds. The e¤ects of some
regulatory provisions often drift away from the original public interest, result-
ing in the protection of special interest groups. As a result, existing regulations
are likely to be unnecessarily restrictive of market mechanisms. PM regulations
may include restrictions on rm decisions over entry, exit, the use of inputs, the
quantities and the types of output produced as well as prices. Entry regulations
create xed costs of entry that generate rents (Fonseca et al. (2001), Spector
2002; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003), reducing the number of competing rms
and output in the long-run. Empirical analysis helps to gauge the relevance
of interactions between product and labor markets. Using a standard Layard-
Nickell-Jackman framework, Boeri et al. (2000) and Nicoletti et al. (1999)
nd that various measures of product market regulation are negatively related
to employment rates. Messina (2003) relates negatively a measure of entry
costs to the overall employment rate. Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) nd that
anti-competitive product market regulations are negatively associated with pro-
ductivity performance. Nicoletti et al. (1999) argue that labor institutions and
rm structure matter to growth. Koeniger (2002) nds that EP decreases incen-
tives to innovate and thus productivity growth depends on the degree of labor
market competition. Therefore, PM and EP have an inuence on job creation
and industry performance, the more detrimental the stricter the regulations.
The third strand of literature is related to studies which combine nancial
and labor markers. Wasmer and Weil (2004) develop a matching model and
introduce labor market institutions and nancial markets imperfections and
they conclude that nancial restrictions are important in explaining growth
when there are frictions in the labor market. Blanchower and Oswald (1998)
show that di¢ culties to access external nance discourage entrepreneurship and
employment. Furthermore, there are papers that relate nancial constraints to
the duration of employment contracts. Rendon (2000) shows that liquidity
constraints restrict job creation even when the labor market is exible.
In this paper we link the strands of literature just commented to analyze
the relationship between the nancial development and the rigidity of labor
markets on growth. We claim that it may be e¢ cient for a rm operating in
a rigid labor market to employ few workers compared to a rm operating in
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an environment with a exible labor markets. Several papers in the law and
nance literature have shown that rms operating in more developed nancial
markets are able to attract more external nance to realize investment projects
and have more possibilities to grow. Rigidities in product and labor market have
shown to reduce job creation and rm size. Therefore, rm growth is a¤ected
by the capacity to attract external funds to invest and the possibility to adapt
workforce to business cycle. We identify two di¤erent aspects of the growth
drivers: the nance e¤ect and the labor and product e¤ect
Figure 1 develops the di¤erence between the nance e¤ect and the labor
e¤ect. We assume that the optimal production point entails combinations of
assets and labor force that lay along the line from the origin through point
A. Imagine that there is an increase in demand and that the rm wants to
expand in order to attend this demand increase. If the rm operates in a well
developed nancial market, the rm would be able to raise enough external
funds to nance the desired expansion (in terms of assets and workforce) in
point D. If the supply of external nancing is limited, the rm may only be able
to reach point C. The di¤erence between point C and D could then be entitled
to a more limited supply of external funds, the nance e¤ect. However, it may
be e¢ cient for the rm to choose point B rather than point C. This would be
the case if the rm has high labor cost. The rm will choose few workforce
than optimal in order to avoid facing high ring costs when demand decrease.
This may be the case of many European countries, where the high dismissal
impede rms adapt rapidly to business cycle. With labor rigidities, it will be
less attractive for a rm to increase labor force. Similarly, we can argue for the
product market restrictions, if a rm wants to initiate activity in a industry
di¤erent where it is at present to take advantage of knowledge, synergies or
economies of scale. The more product restriction or barriers to entry may cause
underinvestment problems (a lower combination of assets and labor force than
optimal).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
If it was the case that there are no frictions in nancial markets but there
were rigidities in labor or product market, rms would choose a point like E.
Thus, point E illustrates the case where the nance e¤ect is absent and the
deviation from the optimal allocation (point D) can be contributed fully to the
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labor e¤ect that arises from rigidities in the labor and product market.
The discussion above suggests that rm growth is a¤ected by nancial devel-
opment but also by labor and product market regulations. In particular, rms
operating in developed nancial development will have easier access to external
funds that in turn will be reected in higher growth rates. However, labor and
product restrictions may a¤ect negatively future investment decisions. To em-
pirically test which e¤ect will dominate we propose to extend RZ methodology
to include the labor e¤ect. We add to the basic model in RZ a term that accounts
for the typical size for each industrial sector and an index of the country labor
and product market regulation. We then test whether industrial sectors that
typically present larger size grow faster (slower) in countries with more (less)
exible product and labor market regulations. Claessens and Laeven (2003) use
the same methodology for analyzing property rights. Accordingly, Fisman and
Sarria-Allende (2004) study the e¤ect of entry regulation in industry structure.
In contrast to the latter study, we are interested in sector growth. Moreover,
we introduce EP and PM with nancial development.
We use US industry data to construct proxies for the average size for a
particular industry. The presumption here is that the well developed nancial
markets and the exible labor and product markets in the US should allow
US rms to achieve the desired nancial and size structure. The underlying
hypothesis is that US labor markets adapt better to the business cycles than
other economy.
Following RZ, the regressions include the industry´s market share in total
manufacturing in the specic country to control for di¤erences in growth po-
tential across industries. Industries with large market shares may have less
growth potential than industries with small initial market shares when there is
an industry-specic convergence. The initial share may also help to control for
other variations between countries, such as in their initial comparative advan-
tage among certain industries based on factors other than nancial development
and EP and PM regulations.
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2 Data
2.1 Data Set
This study uses a data set that combines industry level information on rm
size, number of rms, number of employees, investment and access to external
nance with country-level institutional variables, namely data on labor market.
Industry data come from the UNIDO data base. We include data from 15
developed countries. Table 1 presents an overview of the variables used in the
empirical analysis and their sources. Most of the variables are self-explanatory
and have been used in previous studies of rm nancing and rm structure.
Together with this data, we have included information on external nancial
needs collected by RZ (1998). The period considered is 1981-1998, although the
country coverage is not uniform.
[Insert table 1 here]
2.2 Country-level data
Together with industry data, we introduce institutional data to account for the
nature of capital labor and product markets. It is very hard to classify legal
institutions and compress their description into indicators that are the essential
input to statistical analysis (Giannetti et al., 2002). This di¢ culty is even
greater in the case of the labor market because of its dynamics and complexity.
However, di¤erent papers have recently introduced such measures successfully.
We will focus on two di¤erent types of regulation: employment protection (EP)
and product market regulation (PM).
2.2.1 Financial Development
Ideally, nancial development should measure the ease with which borrowers and
savers can be brought together, RZ (1998). Therefore, nancial development
should be related to the variety of intermediaries and markets available. We
use two di¤erent measures of nancial development: stock capitalization and
domestic credit over gdp. Both have been widely used in the nancial literature.
2.2.2 Employment protection index
The index used describes the strength of the legal framework governing hiring
and ring of employees. The total employment protection index is developed
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by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). This series was built chaining OECD data
with data from Lazear (1990) and is increasing in the strictness of employment
protection. This index is then enlarged and used by Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
and Nickell et al. (2001) among others, providing an employment protection
time varying variable (EP) from 1960 to 1995. The larger the index, the more
employment protection.
2.2.3 Product market regulation
Recently, several measures and indexes have been developed to proxy for market
regulations. As proxies for the level of product market regulation, we use three
di¤erent measures of entry regulation that come from di¤erent sources, each
having advantages and disadvantages. The rst two indexes are developed by
Djankov et al. (2002); "time" accounts for the time required to start business
activity and procedures measures the numbers of procedures needed to start a
business. A procedurein the start-up process is a separate activity when the
entrepreneur has to interact with outside entities. The third index we use is
"barr" and it is developed by LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997). This index provides
information about barriers to competition. All three indexes present higher
values when there exist more restrictions to market competition.
[Insert table 2 here]
As it can be observed, the indicators of nancial development are not corre-
lated with the measures of EP and PR. Table 2 presents the summary statistics
of the country-specic variables. It seems that countries with more developed
nancial sector present more exible labor and product markets. This is co-
herent with the evidence reported by La Porta et al. (1998), and Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003) although the correlation is not perfect, such that there are
countries that are nancially developed but present highly regulated labor and
product markets such as Germany or Japan.
The main disadvantage of these measures is that they are valid for the last
part of the nineties. The growth regressions, however, cover the period 1980 to
1998. Ideally, one would want to use proxies for market regulation for the whole
period, but due to data availability, this is not possible. Furthermore, the fact
that PM regulations do not account for the whole period may raise concerns
in our specications, basically because PM may have evolved in response to
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economic performance. However, measures of institutional frameworks have
been found to be quite stable over long periods of time, Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003). The stability also seems to apply to
the PM measures. Another possible concern is the di¤erent sources of the data.
However, we do not think this is a relevant issue such that all measures appear
quite related and are highly positively correlated (table 3).
[Insert table 3 here]
3 Model specications and estimation
The dependent variable is the average annual growth in value added (number
of establishments) in a particular sector j in a particular country k, with one
observation per sector in each country. The specication for the rst set of
regression is as follows:
G row thj;k = +  1  industry dummiesj + (1)
+ 2  country dummiesk
+ 3  industry share of manufacturing value addedj;k
+ 4  (external dependenceUS;j  financial developmentk)
+ 5  (average sizeUS;j  product or labor regulationk)
+"j;k
In order to estimate equation (1), we drop the benchmark country, the
United States. We use the RZ data for external nancial dependence, but we
construct the typical industry size on US industry basis. The assumption is that
US industry average size is a good proxy because US labor markets adapt bet-
ter to the business cycles than other economy.1 Similarly, Claessens and Laeven
(2003) use US intangible intensity to proxy for the typical nancial external
dependence and the typical ratio of intangible to xed asset, respectively.
This approach overcomes identication problems encountered in standard
cross-country growth regression by interacting a country feature (nancial de-
velopment) with an industry characteristic (external nancial dependence of a
1 It is well known that the labor turnover and the exit and entry of rms in the market
adapt better to the business cycles in US than in other countries. This is directly related in
the literature with EP and PM.
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particular industry). This approach is less subject to criticism regarding an
omitted variable bias or model specication than traditional approaches and
allow to isolate the desired e¤ect. It assumes that there are technological and
economic reasons why some industries present larger size than others do, and
that these di¤erences, to a large extent, persist across countries. This does not
mean that we assume that a sector in two countries with the same level of em-
ployment protection have the same size, we only assume the similarities across
industries. We are conscious, however, that there are other local factors that
can a¤ect rm decisions and therefore, these factors are allowed to di¤er across
countries in the analysis.
Firm size is computed in terms of the number of employees. The simple
average size (total employment divided by total number of rms per sector) is
not an appropriate measure for two reasons. First, it ignores the richness of
the data on the distribution of rm size. Second, as pointed out by Kumar
et al. (2001) it could give a number that has little bearing on the size of
the rm that have the greatest share in the sectors production. Davis and
Henrekson (1999) suggest the co-worker mean as a way to emphasize the number
of employees at the average workers place of employment. By squaring the
number of employees, this measure emphasizes larger rms. We adapt this
measure to our data. We rst compute the simple average in each sector, then
we multiply for the proportion of employment in that sector.
Table 4 presents the typical average size for US rms in the sectors of the
sample. The variation of size across industries is large: it ranges from the
minimum for the petroleum and coal products to the maximum of the transport
equipment. These di¤erences capture the distinct nature of those sectors more
working-force intense versus those industries that rely less in working force.2
[Insert table 4 here]
The basic model is estimated using OLS. To avoid possible biases caused by
any omitted country-specic regressors, we have included country dummies to
capture any institutional or other di¤erences a¤ecting growth, such as compar-
ative advantage or general level of development. Since we are less interested in
the importance of general country di¤erences, we use this approach rather than
2We could not nd any systematic study that documented these patterns at an industrial
level.
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a vector of specic country control variables. Industry dummies (not reported)
are also included in all regressions. Another concern is that EP legislation and
PM regulations are a¤ected by rm strategic competition and the resulting
growth patterns. Therefore, there exist a potential endogeneity problem.
In order to discard this issue we use instrumental variable (IV) estimation.
Following previous literature we use three variables as instruments for the coun-
try structures: the origin of the legal system, gdp and average years of schooling
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001 and Carlin and Mayer,
2003). La Porta et al. (1997) argue that legal systems have a long history
and have shaped the development of accompanying institutions. Legal origin
can therefore be treated as exogenous variables in analyzing modern economic
regulation. In the presence of economies of scale in nancial institutions and
systems, the average years of schooling and the economic level (gdp) will a¤ect
labor and product market regulations and nancial structure respectively. The
instruments have been used to construct interaction terms with the industry
nancial feature. We perform a Durbin-Wu- Hausman (DWH) test of overiden-
tifying restrictions. The test veries the null hypothesis that the introduction
of IVs has no e¤ects on the estimates of the regressions coe¢ cients. DWH test
is reported for each specication. If the p-value is below the 10 per cent, then
IV estimates are reported. Otherwise, OLS are reported. When the test fails
to reject the null hypothesis IV do not particularly alter the result of the OLS
estimations and EP and PM regulations are robust to the issue of endogeneity.
4 Empirical Results
Table 5 presents the main results when total capitalization proxies for nancial
development. Panel A collects the results with EP and panel B the results with
PM. In all specications, industry´s market share is included. Market share
presents a negative sign, in line with RZ suggesting that there is some industry-
specic convergence. The rst column includes only the nancial interaction
term. The sign is positive and signicant, that is, those sectors more nancially
dependent grow faster in more nancially developed markets. The channel of
this enhancing e¤ect is the greater availability of external nancing. This is con-
sistent with the ndings of RZ and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Claessens
and Laeven (2003) among others.
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[Insert table 5]
Column 2 in panel A introduces the interaction with EP. The sign of the
interaction is negative and signicant. Therefore, industrial sectors using rel-
atively more working force develop more slowly in countries with tighter la-
bor protection. In other words, more exible labor regulation foster economic
growth as they facilitate the adaptation to the business cycle. Moreover, it will
be more important for industries which require more labor turnover. The most
of real growth comes from growth in size of the existing rms and from new
rms (RZ). Then, industries with a larger need of job creation will be a¤ected
negatively by a strictness EP. Column 3 presents the two interaction e¤ects to-
gether. Both maintain the signs and signicance found in previous realisations.
Financial development and EP enter with di¤erent sign, furthermore, the co-
e¢ cient of labor is signicantly larger than that of the EP, hence, strict labor
regulation overcomes the positive e¤ect of nancial development. Therefore,
governments that want to promote economic activity should pay attention not
only to frictions in nancial markets but also to rigidities in labor markets.
Panel B presents the results for PM regulation. In column 1, it appears the
nancial interaction alone. Column 2 introduces the interaction with the time
variable. The nancial interaction presents a positive and signicant coe¢ cient
and the timeinteraction is signicant but negative. Therefore, the more time
needed to establish a corporate or sole proprietor business the more detrimental
e¤ects for growth in those sector more labor intense. Column 3 presents the
results for the procedureinteraction. The number of procedures has a signi-
cant and negative e¤ect on growth. In this case, however, nancial development
interaction presents a positive but insignicant coe¢ cient. Hence, there is a
hindering e¤ect associated with the number of procedures but not a positive ef-
fect derived from a developed nancial environment. Finally, column 4 includes
the interaction with barriers to entry that presents a negative and signicant
coe¢ cient. Therefore, the more barriers to entry the lower growth for sectors
with more working force demand. In this case, nancial interaction is positive
and signicant again. Both the coe¢ cient of timeand barriersinteractions
are greater than the nancial interaction term coe¢ cient. But being all signi-
cant, nancial development alleviates the detrimental e¤ects that PM originates
on growth. However, the coe¢ cient of proceduresis not compensated by the
nancial interaction term.
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As we have seen for the EP, industries with a more job creation need, i.e.
existing rms which growth in size or start ups rms, are negatively a¤ected by
more PM regulations.
5 Robustness tests
We next present evidence that results are robust to di¤erent measures of -
nancial development and economic growth (see Table 6). In panel A, we use a
di¤erent measure of nancial development: domestic credit over gdp instead of
the stock market capitalization over gdp. Both of them have been widely used
in the nancial literature. Results are qualitatively similar to those explained
above in terms of signs and signicance. In panel B, we use an alternative
dependent variable denition. We use growth in the number of establishment.
Around two third of real growth comes from growth in the average size of the
existing establishments and one third comes from growth in the number of the
new establishments. Our results are conrmed. The only di¤erences are the
non signicant nancial interaction when EP interaction is introduced (column
2). And the non signicant procedures interaction (column 4). Henceforth, re-
sults maintain with alternative measures of nancial development and economic
growth.
[Insert table 6]
6 Conclusions
Countries di¤er in their labor and product market regulations. This paper
shows empirically the relationship between nance market, labor and market
regulations and economic growth. These regulations a¤ect rm growth sig-
nicantly. Our estimation results show that the interaction between external
nancial needs and nancial development is positive and signicant. Indus-
trial sectors that are in need of external nance are larger in countries with
more developed nancial markets. This is a well known result. What we nd
of interesting is that strictness EP legislation and PM regulation overcome the
positive e¤ect of nancial development. These regulations have a negative e¤ect
on growth of those sectors more labor intensive.
Therefore, the main insights of our results are that reforms in nancial
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sectors are important to help performance, but reforms in product and labor
markets are also relevant. Hence, politicians should turn attention to market
regulations that impede the normal market mechanism, which hinder growth
signicantly, especially to those sectors that are more labor intensive. More de-
velopment in nancial markets together with new EP and PM regulation should
be implemented. There is evidence of the evolution and development of Euro-
pean nancial markets in the nineties although there still exists a gap with the
US nancial market, but di¤erences in labor and product markets continue to
be very signicant. Further comparative research at institutional level should
be done across these both economies.
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TABLE 1:  DEFINITION AND SOURCE OF THE VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Variable Name Description 
Fraction of sector Fraction of NACE three-digit industry in value added of total manufacturing sector in 1980. 
 In value added Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. 
Market cap (CAP) Stock market capitalization divided by GDP in 1980. Source RZ (1998) 
Domestic credit 
(Dcredit) 
Domestic credit divided by GDP in 1980. Source International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Fin Dependence External financial dependence of U.S. sectors averaged over 1980 - 1989. Source RZ (1998). 
  
EP Employment Protection Law data. This index captures the strictness of employment  
  protection laws. Sources: OECD, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)and Nickell et al. (2003)  
Time Product Market Regulation data. This varible measures the days needed to   
  the creation of corporate and sole proprietor businesses. Source: Djankov et al. (2001) 
Procedures Number of procedures to set a firm. Source: Djankov et al. (2001) 
Weeks Number of weeks to set a firm. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997)  
Barriers (BARR) Barriers to competition. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997) and Nicoletti.et at. (1999). 
Index The index is defined as (no. of weeks + no. of procedures/average procedures per week)/2 
  Source: Fonseca et al. (2001) 
Start-up costs Administrative burdens on startups Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997)  
Regulation Regulatory and administrative opacity.Source: LOGOTECH S.A. (1997) 
  
Growth in number Average growth  in number of establishment by ISIC sector over the period 1981 to 1998.  
 Of establishment Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. 
Growth in value 
added  
Average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector by ISIC in a particular 
country  over the period 1981 – 1998. Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. 
Corruption Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Legal origin Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC OF INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in our study. For each variable, we report the 
mean of the period for each country. The definition and sources of the variables are reported in table 1.   
 
 
Country EP Procedures Time Barr Dcredit Cap 
Austria 1.293 9 3.610 1.6 0.77 0.89 
Belgium 1.461 8 3.496 2.55 0.29 0.651 
Canada 0.3 2 0.693 0.8 0.45 0.98 
Denmark 0.956 3 1.098 1.32 0.42 0.56 
Finland 1.152 5 3.178 1.93 0.48 0.52 
Germany 1.447 10 3.737 2.1 0.78 1.08 
Ireland 0.503 3 2.772 1.2 0.5 0.5 
Italy 1.911 16 4.127 2.74 0.42 0.98 
Japan 1.4 11 3.25 2.33 0.86 1.31 
Netherlands 1.311 8 3.433 1.41 0.6 0.91 
New Zeland 0.8 3 1.098 1.21 0.49 0.85 
Norway 1.485 4 2.890 1.33 0.34 0.63 
Portugal 1.933 12 4.330 1.46 0.52 0.82 
Spain 1.811 11 4.406 1.77 0.76 1.02 
Sweden 1.68 6 2.564 1.8 0.42 0.79 
UK 0.35 5 1.386 0.48 0.25 0.78 
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TABLE 3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EP AND PM VARIABLES 
 
This table reports the correlations between the main institutional variables used in our study. The 
definition and sources of the variables are reported in table 1.   
 
 EP Procedures Time Barr Dcredit Cap 
EP 1      
Procedures 0.7818* 1     
Time 0.8200* 0.8216* 1    
Barr 0.7234* 0.7011* 0.6701* 1   
Dcredit -0.0859 0.0311 0.1188 0.0295 1  
Cap 0.0291 0.3986 0.1936 0.1523 0.6999* 1 
*significant at 5% 
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TABLE 4: INDUSTRY SIZE 
 
The table reports the coworker mean for size for each sector based on US sector-level data. The data are 
averages for the period 1982-1992. 
SIC Code Industrial  Sector Coworker mean 
311 food products 8.99 
313 beverages   1.55 
314 tobacco  2.14 
321 textiles  6.01 
322 wearing apparel 5.48 
323 leather products 0.25 
324 footwear except rubber or plastic 1.67 
331 wood products, except furniture 0.88 
332 furniture, except metal 1.15 
341 paper and products 5.04 
342 printing and publishing 2.59 
351 industrial chemicals 3.93 
352 other chemicals 2.15 
353 petroleum refineries 2.14 
354 misc. Petroleum and coal products 0.07 
355 rubber products 1.80 
356 plastic products 1.52 
361 pottery, chine earthenware 0.11 
362 glass and products 0.96 
369 other non metallic mineral products 0.64 
371 iron and steel 6.45 
372 non-ferrous metals  1.39 
381 fabricated metal products 3.66 
382 machinery, except electrical 6.36 
383 machinery electrical 13.81 
384 transport equipment  16.04 
385 professional ans scientific equipment 2.75 
390 other manufactured products 0.48 
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TABLE 5: GROWTH EQUATIONS 
 
PANEL A: Employment protection 
 
The dependent variable, growth, is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial 
sector in each country between 1980-1998. The interaction terms are US financial dependence times 
national financial development (proxied by stock market capitalisation over gdp in 1980) and US typical 
size times national employment protection laws. Standard errors and t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. Last line reports D-W-H test for the endogeneity of interaction terms. Provided the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected, IV estimations are presented. Instruments are legal origin, gdp 
and average years of schooling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
    
 
 
ggva8098 ggva8098 ggva8098 
Industry’s market share -0.3506*** -0.3571*** -0.3565*** 
 [0.06233] [0.06162] [0.06217] 
Financial dependence* 
financial development 
 
0.00015***  
 
0.00016*** 
 [0.00005]  [0.00005] 
EP*typical average size  -0.01782*** -0.0179*** 
  [0.00478] [0.00482] 
Constant 0.15713*** 0.15166*** 0.15487*** 
 [0.00606] [0.00625] [0.00621] 
Observations 3500 3500 3500 
R-squared 0.39 0.38 0.40 
D-W-H 0.28089 1.51324 4.71101 
 
      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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TABLE 5: GROWTH EQUATIONS 
 
PANEL B: Product market regulation 
The dependent variable, growth, is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial 
sector in each country between 1980-1998. The interaction terms are US financial dependence times 
national financial development (proxied by stock market capitalisation over gdp in 1980) and US typical 
size times national product market regulations, namely time to start activity, number of procedures and 
barriers to competition. Standard errors and t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Last line 
reports D-W-H test for the endogeneity of interaction terms. Provided the null hypothesis of exogeneity is 
rejected, IV estimations are presented. Instruments are legal origin, gdp and average years of schooling. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ggva8098 ggva8098 ggva8098 ggva8098 
 
Industry’s market share -0.3506*** -0.3537*** -.4673*** -0.3427*** 
 [0.06233] [0.06152] [0.1720] [0.06298] 
Financial dependence* 
financial development 0.00015*** 0.00015*** .002020    0.00015*** 
 [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00133] [0.00005] 
Time* 
UStypical average size  -0.0181***   
  [0.00619]   
Procedures* 
UStypical verage size      -0.37739**  
   [0.1609]  
Barriers competition* 
UStypical average size    -0.0332*** 
    [0.00715] 
 
Constant 0.15713*** 0.09360*** .55331*** 0.09976*** 
 [0.00606] [0.00544] [0.1749] [0.00540] 
 
Observations 3500 3500 1970 3500 
 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.0748 0.40 
D-W-H 0.28089 1.69434 9.16731** 0.05021 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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TABLE 6: ROBUST ANALYSIS 
 
Panel A: Alternative measure of financial development 
The dependent variable, growth, is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial 
sector in each country between 1980-1998. The interaction terms are US financial dependence times 
national financial development (proxied by domestic credit over gdp in 1980) and US typical size times 
national employment protection laws and national product market regulations, namely time to start 
activity, number of procedures and barriers to competition. Standard errors and t-statistics are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. Last line reports D-W-H test for the endogeneity of interaction terms. Provided the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected, IV estimations are presented. Instruments are legal origin, gdp 
and average years of schooling. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
ggva8098 ggva8098 ggva8098 ggva8098 ggva8098 
 
Industry’s market 
share -0.3355*** -0.3408*** -0.3385*** -0.3369 *** -0.3272*** 
 
[0.06316] [0.0630] [0.06234] [0.0628] [0.0638] 
Financial dependence* 
financial development 0.0210*** 0.0208***    0.0221*** 0.0217*** 0.0223*** 
 
[0.0074] [0.00751] [0.0075] [0.0075] [0.00761] 
EP* 
UStypical average size  -0.02036***      
 
 [0.00536]    
Time* 
UStypical average size   -0.02076***   
 
  [0.00690]   
Procedures* 
UStypical verage size    -0.0202**     
 
   [0.00967]  
Barriers competition* 
UStypical average size     -0.03494*** 
 
    [0.0079] 
 
Constant 0 .1557***    0.15281***    0.11811***    0.16374***    0.0999***    
 
[0.00615] [0.00635] [0.0056] [0.0072] [0.0055] 
 
Observations 3410 3410 3410 3410 3410 
 
R-squared 0.3877 0.3903 0.3901 0.3893 0.3914 
D-W-H 0.0000 2.5145 0.01678 0.08700 1.4812 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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TABLE 6: ROBUST ANALYSIS 
 
PANEL B: Growth in the number of establishment 
The dependent variable, growth, is the average rate of growth in the number of establishments for each 
industrial sector in each country between 1980-1998. The interaction terms are US financial dependence 
times national financial development (proxied by stock market capitalisation over gdp in 1980) and US 
typical size times national employment protection laws and national product market regulations, namely 
time to start activity, number of procedures and barriers to competition. Standard errors and t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Last line reports D-W-H test for the endogeneity of interaction terms. 
Provided the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected, IV estimations are presented. Instruments are legal 
origin, gdp and average years of schooling. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
ggestb8098 ggestb8098 ggestb8098 ggestb8098 ggestb8098 
 
Industry’s market 
share -4.6160*** -3.3293* -4.6284*** -4.6215*** -4.6055*** 
 
[1.06896] [1.92837] [1.07476] [1.07232] [1.06572] 
Financial dependence* 
financial development 0.00105*** -.01507    0.00105*** 0.00108*** 0.00105*** 
 
[0.00040] [0.01102] [0.00040] [0.00040] [0.00040] 
EP* 
UStypical average size  -.34185*       
 
 [0.1759]    
Time* 
UStypical average size   -0.06246*   
 
  [0.03716]   
Procedures* 
UStypical verage size    -0.03763  
 
   [0.03169]  
Barriers competition* 
UStypical average size     -0.04423* 
 
    [0.02958] 
 
Constant 0.00058 -.14344    0.04864 0.04587 0.03187 
 
[0.01649] [0.11389] [0.03153] [0.04052] [0.02786] 
 
Observations 3500 2000 3500 3500 3500 
 
R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 
D-W-H 1.2604 8.2421** 0.09862 0.86481 1.10805 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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